Abstract. The paper considers the consensus problem in a partially synchronous system with Byzantine processes. In this context, the literature distinguishes authenticated Byzantine faults, where messages can be signed by the sending process (with the assumption that the signature cannot be forged by any other process), and Byzantine faults, where there is no mechanism for signatures (but the receiver of a message knows the identity of the sender). The paper proposes an abstraction called weak interactive consistency (WIC ) that unifies consensus algorithms with and without signed messages. WIC can be implemented with and without signatures.
Introduction
Consensus is probably the most fundamental problem in fault tolerant distributed computing. Consensus is related to the implementation of state machine replication, atomic broadcast, group membership, etc. The problem is defined over a set of processes Π, where each process p i ∈ Π has an initial value v i , and requires that all processes agree on a common value.
With respect to process faults, consensus can be considered with different fault assumptions. On the one end of the spectrum, processes fail only by crashing (so called benign faults); on the other end, faulty processes can exhibit an arbitrary (and even malicious) behavior. Among the latter, two fault models are considered in literature [1] : authenticated Byzantine faults, where messages can be signed by the sending process (with the assumption that the signature cannot be forged by any other process), and Byzantine faults, where there is no mechanism for signatures (but the receiver of a message knows the identity of the sender).
1
Consensus protocols that assume Byzantine faults (without authentication) are harder to develop and prove correct [3] . As a consequence, they tend to be more complicated and harder to understand than the protocols that assume 1 In [2] , the latter is called Byzantine faults with oral messages. authenticated Byzantine faults, even when they are based on the same idea. The existence of these two fault models raises the following question: is there a way to transform an algorithm for authenticated Byzantine faults into an algorithm for Byzantine faults, or vice versa?
This question has been addressed by Srikanth and Toueg in [3] for the Byzantine agreement problem, 2 by defining the authenticated broadcast primitive. Authenticated broadcast is a communication primitive that provides additional guarantees compared to, e.g., a normal (unreliable) broadcast. Srikanth and Toueg solve Byzantine agreement using authenticated broadcast, and show that authenticated broadcast can be implemented with and without signatures.
However, authenticated broadcast does not encapsulate all the possible uses of signed messages when solving consensus. One typical example is the Fast Byzantine Paxos algorithm [4] , which relies on signed messages whenever the coordinator changes.
Complementing the approach of [3] , we define an abstraction different from authenticated broadcast that we call weak interactive consistency. 3 Interactive consistency is defined in [7] as a problem where correct processes must agree on a vector such that the ith element of this vector is the initial value of the ith process if this process is correct. Our abstraction is a weaker variant of interactive consistency, hence the name "weak" interactive consistency. Similarly to authenticated broadcast, weak interactive consistency can be implemented with and without signatures. We illustrate the power of weak interactive consistency by reexamining two seminal Byzantine consensus algorithms: the Castro-Liskov PBFT algorithm, which does not use signatures [8] , and the Martin-Alvisi FaB Paxos algorithm, which relies on signatures [4] . We show how to express these two algorithms using the weak interactive consistency abstraction, and call these two algorithms CL (for Castro-Liskov), resp. MA (for Martin-Alvisi).
Both CL and MA are very concise algorithms. Moreover, replacing in CL weak interactive consistency with a signature-free implementation basically leads to the original signature-free PBFT algorithm, while replacing in MA weak interactive consistency with a signature-based implementation basically leads to the original signature-based FaB Paxos algorithm. In the latter case, the algorithm obtained is almost identical to the original algorithm; in the former case, the differences are slightly more important (the differences are explained in [9] ). In addition, using MA with a signature-free implementation of WIC allows us to derive a signature-free variant of FaB Paxos. 2 In this problem, a transmitter sends a message to a set of processes, all processes eventually deliver a single message, and (i) all correct processes agree on the same message, (ii) if the transmitter is correct, then all correct processes agree on the message of the transmitter. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Weak interactive consistency is informally introduced in Section 2. Section 3 defines our model, and formally defines weak interactive consistency. In Section 4 we show that weak interactive consistency can be implemented with and without signatures. Section 5 describes the MA consensus algorithm (FaB Paxos expressed using weak interactive consistency) and the CL consensus algorithm (PBFT expressed using weak interactive consistency). Section 6 discusses related work, and Section 7 concludes the paper. For space reason, some proofs are omitted. They can be found in [9] .
Weak Interactive Consistency: An Informal Introduction

On the Use of Signatures
We start by addressing the following question: where are signatures used in coordinator based consensus algorithms? Signatures are typically used each time the coordinator changes, as done for example in the FaB Paxos algorithm [4] . The corresponding communication pattern is illustrated in Fig. 1(a) , and addresses the following issue. Assume that the previous coordinator has brought the system into a configuration where a process already decided v; in this case, in order to ensure safety (i.e., agreement) the new coordinator can only propose v. This is done as follows. First every process sends its current estimate to the new coordinator (v i sent by p i to p 1 in Fig. 1(a) ). Second, if the coordinator p 1 receives a quorum of messages, then p 1 applies a function f that returns some value x. The quorum ensures that if a process has already decided v, then f returns v. Finally, the value returned by f is then sent to all (x sent by p 1 in Fig. 1(a) ). This solution does not work with a Byzantine coordinator: the value sent by the coordinator p 1 might not be the value returned by f . Safety can here be ensured using signatures: Processes p i sign the estimates v i sent to the coordinator p 1 , and p 1 sends x together with the quorum of signed estimates it received. This allows a correct process p i , receiving x from p 1 , to verify whether x is consistent with the function f . If not, then p i ignores x.
Are signatures mandatory here? We investigate this question, first addressing safety and then liveness.
Safe Updates Requires Neither Signatures Nor a Coordinator
As said, safety means that if a process has decided v, and thus a quorum of processes had v as their estimate at the beginning of the two rounds of Fig.  1(a) , then each process can only update its estimate to v. This property can be ensured without signatures and without coordinator: each process p i simply sends v i to all, and each process p i behaves like the coordinator: if p i receives a quorum of messages, it updates its estimate with the value returned by f . This shows that updating the estimate maintaining safety does not require a coordinator. However, as we show in the next section, a coordinator is reintroduced for liveness.
Coordinator for Liveness
The coordinator in Fig. 1 (a) has two roles: (i) it ensures safety (using signatures), and (ii) it tries to bring the system into a univalent configuration (if not yet so), in order to ensure liveness (i.e., termination) of the consensus algorithm. A configuration typically becomes v-valent as soon as a quorum of correct processes update their estimate to v. This is ensured by a correct coordinator, if its message is received by a quorum of correct processes. Ensuring that a quorum of correct processes update their estimate to the same value v can also be implemented without signatures with an all-to-all communication schema, if all correct processes receive the same set (of quorum size) of values. Indeed, if two correct processes apply f to the same set of values, they update their estimate to the same value.
However, ensuring that all correct processes receive the same set of messages is problematic in the presence of Byzantine processes: (i) a Byzantine process can send v to some correct process p i and v to some other correct process p j , and (ii) a Byzantine process can send v to some correct process p i and nothing to some other correct process p j .
These problems can be addressed using two all-to-all rounds and one all-tocoordinator rounds, as shown in Fig. 1 (b) (to be compared with the "init" round followed by the "echo" round of authenticated broadcast, see [3] ).
These three rounds can be seen as one all-to-all super-round that "always" satisfies integrity and "eventually" satisfies consistency:
Integrity. If a correct process p receives v from a correct process q in super-round r, then v was sent by q in super-round r. Consistency. (i) If a correct process p i sends v in super-round r, then every correct process receives v from p i in super-round r, and (ii) all correct processes receive the same set of messages in super-round r.
As noted in Section 2.2, integrity ensures safety. As noted at the beginning of this section, eventual consistency allows us to eventually bring the system into a univalent configuration, thus ensuring liveness. In the scheme of Fig. 1 (b) we combine the concept of a coordinator as depicted in Fig. 1(a) with the authentication scheme of [3] .
This scheme provides that in synchronous rounds (which eventually exist in a partially synchronous model, see Section 3), messages received by a correct coordinator in the "forward" round (see Fig. 1(b) ), are received by all correct processes in the "echo" round (see Fig. 1(b) ). 4 Note that without having the coordinator, the authentication scheme of [3] is not able to provide a superround such that all processes receive the same set of messages at the end of this super-round, since a Byzantine process can always prevent this from happening.
We call the problem of always ensuring integrity and eventually consistency the weak interactive consistency problem, or simply WIC. 5 We show below that WIC is a unifying concept for Byzantine consensus algorithms. WIC can be implemented with signatures in two rounds ( Fig. 1(a) ), or without signatures in three rounds ( Fig. 1(b) ), as shown in Section 4.
Model and Definition of WIC
Assuming synchronous rounds is a strong assumption that we do not want to consider here. On the other side, an asynchronous system is not strong enough: WIC is not implementable in such a system. We consider a third option, i.e., a partially synchronous system [1] , or rather a slightly weaker variant of this model: we assume that the system alternates between good periods (during which the system is synchronous) and bad periods (during which the system is asynchronous). As in [1] , we consider an abstraction on top of the system model, namely a round model, defined next. Using this abstraction rather than the raw system model improves the clarity of the algorithms and simplifies the proofs.
Among the n processes in our system, we assume that at most t are Byzantine. We do not make any assumption about behavior of Byzantine processes. The set of correct processes is denoted by C.
Basic Round Model
In each round r, a process p sends a message according to a sending function S r p to a subset of processes, and, at the end of this round, computes a new state according to a transition function T r p , based on the vector of messages it received and its current state. Note that this implies that a message sent in round r can only be received in round r (rounds are closed). 
Characterizing a Good Period
During a bad period, except P int , no guarantees on the messages a process receives can be provided: it can even happen that no messages at all are received. During a good period it is possible to ensure, for all rounds r in the good period, that all messages sent in round r by a correct process are received in round r by all correct processes. This is formally expressed by the following predicate:
The reader can find in [1] the implementation of rounds that satisfy P good during a good period in the presence of Byzantine processes.
WIC Predicate
We have informally defined WIC by an integrity property and by a consistency property that must hold "eventually". The integrity property is expressed by the predicate P int . "Eventual" consistency formally means that there exists a round r in which consistency holds:
Therefore, WIC is formally expressed by the following predicate:
Note that P cons (r) is stronger than P good (r). Consider two correct processes p and q, and a Byzantine process sending message m to all processes in round r: P good (r) allows m to be received by p and not by q; P cons (r) does not allow this.
Implementing WIC
For implementing WIC, we show in this section that rounds that satisfy P good can be transformed into a round that satisfies P cons . This transformation can be formally expressed thanks to the notion of predicate translation. Given some round r, we say that an algorithm A is a k-round translation of predicate P (e.g., P good ) into predicate P (e.g., P cons ), if round r consists of k micro-rounds r, 1 (iv) for each process p, the messages received by p in round r are computed by p at the end of micro-round r, k ; and (v) P holds for round r. We also say that round r is simulated by the k micro-rounds r, 1 to r, k . We give two translations, one with and one without digital signatures. Both translations rely on a coordinator. The translation with signatures requires two micro-rounds with the communication pattern of Fig. 1(a) whereas the translation without signatures requires three micro-rounds with the communication pattern of Fig. 1(b) 7 . The coordinator of round r is denoted by coord (r). We will analyze the two translations in the following cases: (i) coord(r) is correct and the micro-rounds satisfy P good , and (ii) coord(r) may be faulty and only P int holds for the micro-rounds. In case (i), we have a translation of P good into P cons . Case (ii) ensures that the translation is harmless during bad periods, or if the coordinator is faulty.
Therefore, the big picture is the following. If we assume a sufficient long good period, then [1] shows how to implement rounds for which P good eventually holds. Moreover, the rotating coordinator paradigm eventually ensures rounds with a correct coordinator. Together, this eventually ensures case (i).
Translation with Signatures
Algorithm 1 is a 2-round translation with signatures that preserves P int (i.e., if P int holds for every micro-round, then P int holds for the round). Moreover, when coord(r) is correct, it translates P good into P cons . At the beginning of Algorithm 1 every process p has a message m p (line 5); at the end every process p has a vector M p of received messages (lines 15 Algorithm 1 is straightforward: each process p sends its signed message m p to the coordinator (line 5) in micro-round r, 1 . In micro-round r, 2 , the coordinator forwards all messages received (line 12).
Proposition 1. Algorithm 1 preserves P int (r).
Proposition 2. If coord(r) is correct, then Algorithm 1 translates
P good into P cons .
Translation without Signatures
Algorithm 2 is a 3-round translation with signatures, inspired by [8] , that preserves P int (i.e., if P int holds for every micro-round, then P int holds for the round). Moreover, when coord(r) is correct, it translates P good into P cons . It requires n ≥ 3t + 1. At the beginning of Algorithm 2 every process p has a message m p (line 7); at the end every process p has a vector M p of received messages (lines 22, 24)
9 . We informally explain Algorithm 2 using Fig. 2 Compared to Fig. 1(b), Fig. 2 shows only the messages relevant to v 2 sent by p 2 . Process p 1 is the coordinator. In micro-round r, 1 , process p 2 sends v 2 to all. In micro-round r, 2 , all processes send the value received from p 2 to the coordinator. The coordinator then compares the value received from p 2 in micro-round r, 1 
Proposition 3. Algorithm 2 preserves P int (r).
Proof. Let p, q be two correct processes. Assume for the sake of contradiction that S 
Proposition 4. If coord(r) is correct, then Algorithm 2 translates
Proof. Let p, q be two correct processes, and s some other process (not necessarily correct). Let c be the correct coordinator. Let P good ( r, 1 ), P good ( r, 2 ) and This means that at least 2t + 1 processes, including at least t + 1 correct processes, have received from s in micro-round r, 1 the same message that c received from s, namely v ( ). In micro-round r, 3 , these t + 1 correct processes send received to all. Because P good ( r, 3 ) holds, all these messages are received by q in round r, 3 ( ). Consider now Algorithm 2 from the point of view of q, and again the loop at line 20 for process s. Since the coordinator is correct, it sends at line 18 the same message to p and to q, i.e., at q we also have µ 
Achieving Consensus with WIC
In this section we show how to express the consensus algorithms of CastroLiskov [8] and Martin-Alivisi [4] using WIC. The algorithm of Castro and Lisko solves a sequence of instances of consensus (state machine replication). For simplicity, we consider only one instance of consensus.
Consensus is defined by agreement, termination and a validity property. We consider two validity properties, weak and strong validity [ Both, [8] and [4] achieve only weak validity. Weak validity allows correct processes to decide on the initial value of a Byzantine process. With strong validity, however, this is only possible if not all correct processes have the same initial value. We give algorithms for both, weak and strong validity, and show that strong validity is in fact easy to ensure.
On the Use of WIC
We express the algorithms of this section in the round model defined in Section 3. All rounds of MA and CL require P int to hold. Some of the rounds require P cons to eventually hold. These rounds can be simulated using, e.g., Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2. We explicitly mention those rounds of MA and CL as rounds "in which P cons must eventually hold". The other rounds of MA and CL are ordinary rounds. 
MA Algorithm
The algorithm of Martin and Alvisi [4] is expressed in the context of "proposers", "acceptors" and "learners". For simplicity, we express here consensus without considering these roles. We give two algorithms. The first solves consensus with weak validity and is given as Algorithm 3. In the first phase it corresponds to the "common case" protocol of [4] . All later phases correspond to the "recovery protocol" of [4] (cf. Algorithm 4). The second algorithm solves consensus with strong validity, and is even simpler: all phases are identical, see Algorithm 4. In both algorithms, the notation #(v) is used to denote the number of messages received with value
For MA with weak validity, the first phase needs an initial coordinator, which is denoted by coord . Note that WIC is relevant only to rounds 2φ − 1, φ > 1, of Algorithm 4. If rounds 2φ − 1 are simulated using Algorithm 1, we get the original algorithm of [4] . If rounds 2φ − 1 are simulated using Algorithm 2, we get a new algorithm. In this new algorithm, similarly to the algorithm in [4] , fast decision is possible in two rounds; however, signatures are not used in the recovery protocol.
Both algorithms require n ≥ 5t+1. Agreement, weak validity and strong validity hold without synchrony assumptions. Termination requires (i) one phase φ such that P cons (2φ − 1) holds, and (ii) one phase φ ≥ φ such that P good (2φ ) holds. Note that n ≥ 5t + 1 is only needed for terrmination, while only n ≥ 3t + 1 is needed for agreement and strong validity.
CL Algorithm
The algorithm of Castro and Liskov [8] solves a sequence of instances of consensus (state machine replication). For simplicity, we consider only one instance of consensus. As for MA, we give two algorithms. The first solves consensus with weak validity and is given as Algorithm 5. In the first phase it corresponds to the "common case" protocol of [8] . All later phases correspond to the "view change protocol" of [8] (cf. Algorithm 6). The second algorithm solves consensus with strong validity, and is even simpler: all phases are identical, see Algorithm 6. In both algorithms, the notation #(v) is used to denote the number of messages received with value v, i.e.,
For CL with weak validity, the first phase needs an initial coordinator, which is denoted by coord . In round 1 of this phase the coordinator sends its initial value to all. In round 2 every process that has received the initial value from the coordinator in round 1 resends this value to all. Every process p, upon receiving this value from at least (n + t + 1)/2 processes, updates vote p and tVote p (lines 19 and 20), and then sends vote p to all in round 3. A process receiving in round at least (n + t + 1)/2 messages with the same value v, decides v. For CL with weak validity, WIC is relevant only to rounds 3φ − 2, φ > 1 (cf. Algorithm 6). If rounds 3φ − 2, φ > 1 are simulated using Algorithm 2, we get an algorithm close to the original algorithm of [8] (the differences are explained in [9] ). If rounds 3φ − 2, φ > 1 are simulated using Algorithm 1, we get a variant of PBFT with signatures.
CL with strong validity (see Algorithm 6) consists of a sequence of phases φ, where each phase φ has three rounds 3φ − 2, 3φ − 1 and 3φ. The role of the variables is explained in comments, see lines 2-5. WIC is needed only in round 3φ − 2. Rounds 3φ − 1 and 3φ are the same as rounds 2 and 3 of Algorithm 5.
Related Work
Unification. To the best of our knowledge, there is little work that has tried to unify algorithms for Byzantine faults that use signatures and algorithms that do not use signatures. We are only aware of the work of Skrikanth and Toueg [3] related to authenticated broadcast (as already mentioned in Section 1). Further there is the work of Neiger and Toueg [10] who have developed methods to automatically translate protocols tolerant of benign faults to ones tolerant of more severe faults, including Byzantine faults, in the context of synchronous systems. Abstractions introduced by Lampson in [11] are relevant only to PBFT [8] , and its hard to see how these abstractions can be extended to other Byzantine consensus protocols. Orthogonal to our approach, [12] proposes a solution for implementing digital signatures using MACs (message authentication codes).
Byzantine consensus algorithms. Several models with Byzantine faults have been considered for solving consensus or closely related problems, such as Byzantine agreement or state machine replication. The early work of Lamport, Shostak and Pease [7, 2] considers a synchronous system and proposes algorithms for Interactive Consistency and Byzantine agreement with and without signatures. A weaker system model, namely partial synchrony, has been considered by Dwork, Lynch and Stockmeyer [1] . This is also the model we consider in this paper. In [1] , the authors propose two consensus algorithms for Byzantine faults: one that uses signatures, and one without signatures. In [13] , the authors consider a system with less synchrony than provided by partially synchrony, and describe a consensus algorithm that does not use signatures. Randomized consensus can be solved in an asynchronous system with Byzantine faults, as shown first in [14] . In [15] , the authors solve consensus with Byzantine faults assuming a system equipped with a Trusted Timely Computing Base (TTCB).
Our CL algorithm is a simplified version of PBFT. Other authors have tried to increase the efficiency of PBFT, e.g. [16] . Recently, [17] has proposed a consensus algorithm for Byzantine faults that ensures strong validity, in which the decision is possible in the first round.
Conclusion
The paper has introduced the weak interactive consistency (or WIC ) abstraction, and has shown that WIC allows to unify Byzantine consensus algorithms with and without signatures. This has been illustrated on two seminal Byzantine consensus algorithm, namely on the FaB Paxos algorithm [4] and on the PBFT algorithm [8] . In both cases this leads to a very concise algorithm. Apart from these two algorithms, we also managed to express two other algorithms for Byzantine faults using WIC: the algorithms for Byzantine faults of [1] and a deterministic version of the algorithm for Byzantine faults of [14] , which is the basis for the algorithm in [13] . Therefore, we conjecture that WIC is the abstraction that underlines all Byzantine consensus algorithms for partial synchronous systems.
